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Abstract
We consider a key-exchange protocol based on matrices over a tropical semiring
which was recently proposed in [2]. We show that a particular private parameter of
that protocol can be recovered with a simple binary search, rendering it insecure.
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1 Introduction
Let S be any nonempty subset of R which is closed under addition. Define two operations
⊕ and ⊗ on S by
a⊕ b = min{a, b},
a⊗ b = a+ b.
Both operations are associative and commutative and ⊗ distributes over ⊕, and hence S is a
commutative semiring, called a tropical semiring. The setM = Matk×k(S) of k×k matrices
over S is therefore a semiring with the induced operations
(aij)⊕ (bij) = (aij ⊕ bij),
(aij)⊗ (bij) = (cij), where cij = (ai1 ⊗ b1j)⊕ (ai2 ⊗ b2j)⊕ · · · ⊕ (aik ⊗ bkj).
In [1], the authors proposed two key exchange protocols based on the structure M.
Shortly after, an effective attack was given on one of those protocols in [3]. Subsequently,
a new key exchange protocol was proposed in [2] (in fact, two new protocols, but they are
very closely related to each other). It is this protocol that we consider in this paper.
In [2], the authors give two semigroup operations on M×M each arising as semidirect
product induced by a specified action of these matrices on themselves. The two semigroup
operations are given by
(M,G) ◦ (S,H) =
(
M ⊕ S ⊕H ⊕ (M ⊗H), G⊕H ⊕ (G⊗H)
)
, (1.1)
(M,G) ∗ (S,H) =
(
(H ⊗MT )⊕ (MT ⊗H)⊕ S, G⊗H
)
. (1.2)
Note that for each of these operations, the first component of the product does not depend
on G. This fact plays a key role in the two key exchange protocols they then propose (one
corresponding to each operation):
1. Alice and Bob agree on public matrices M,H ∈ M whose entries are integers in the
range [−N,N ]. Alice selects a private positive integer m < 2K and Bob selects a
private positive integer n < 2K .
2. Alice computes (M,H)m = (A, PA) and sends A to Bob.
3. Bob computes (M,H)n = (B,PB) and sends B to Alice.
4. Alice determines the first component of (M,H)m+n = (M,H)n(M,H)m = (B,PB)(A, PA)
from her knowledge of A, PA, and B (knowledge of PB is not necessary for either of
the operations (1.1) or (1.2).
5. Bob similarly determines the first component of (M,H)m+n = (M,H)m(M,H)n =
(A, PA)(B,PB) from his knowledge of B,PB, and A.
In the next section, we show that an eavesdropper can find a positive integer m′ for which
the first component of (M,H)m
′
is A; she can then use this m′ to compute the shared secret
key in essentially the same way as Alice. Furthermore, such an m′ can be found using O(K2)
operations (1.1) or (1.2).
2 The attack
Since addition of matrices in M is idempotent, i.e., G⊕G = G, we have a partial order on
M defined by
X ≤ Y if X ⊕ Y = X.
Clearly we have that X ≤ Y iff xij ≤ yij for all i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}. Furthermore, this partial
order respects both operations on M; if X ≤ Y and Z ∈ M, then X ⊕ Z ≤ Y ⊕ Z and
X ⊗ Z ≤ Y ⊗ Z.
Proposition 2.1 Consider the semigroupM×M equipped with either of the two operations
defined by (1.1) and (1.2). Let (M,H) ∈ M × M, and for each positive integer ℓ let
(Mℓ, Hℓ) = (M,H)
ℓ. Then the sequence {Mℓ} is monotonically decreasing: M1 ≥ M2 ≥
M3 ≥ . . . .
Proof: Let ℓ ≥ 2. For the operation ◦ we have
(Mℓ, Hℓ) = (Mℓ−1, Hℓ−1) ◦ (M,H)
=
(
Mℓ−1 ⊕M ⊕H ⊕ (Mℓ−1 ⊗H), Hℓ−1 ⊕H ⊕ (Hℓ−1 ⊗H)
)
,
so that Mℓ = Mℓ−1 ⊕M ⊕ H ⊕ (Mℓ−1 ⊗ H). In particular, Mℓ ⊕Mℓ−1 = Mℓ, and hence
Mℓ ≤Mℓ−1.
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Similarly, for the operation ∗ we have that
(Mℓ, Hℓ) = (M,H) ∗ (Mℓ−1, Hℓ−1)
=
(
(Hℓ−1 ⊗M
T )⊕ (MT ⊗Hℓ−1)⊕Mℓ−1, H ⊗Hℓ−1
)
,
and hence Mℓ = (Hℓ−1 ⊗M
T ) ⊕ (MT ⊗ Hℓ−1) ⊕Mℓ−1. Again, Mℓ ⊕Mℓ−1 = Mℓ, so that
Mℓ ≤Mℓ−1.
The problem alluded to at the end of the introduction is now easily solved with a binary
search. Let M,H ∈ M and (M,H)ℓ = (Mℓ, Hℓ). Suppose A ∈ M satisfies A = Mm for
some positive integer m < 2K . First, obtain an upper bound on m by computing successive
squares
M1,M2,M4,M8, . . .
until finding a positive integer t for which M2t ≤ A. Since it is then known that 1 ≤ m ≤ 2
t,
a simple binary search will find an integer m′ for which Mm′ = A. The sequence M1,M2, . . .
is generally strictly decreasing, in which case m′ = m. However, even if m′ 6= m, finding
such an integer m′ is enough for the eavesdropper to recover the shared secret key. Let π1 :
M×M−→M be the map π1(C,D) = C. Suppose (M,H)
n = (B,PB), (M,H)
m = (A, PA)
and (M,H)m
′
= (A, PE). Then for each of the operations (1.1) and (1.2), the shared secret
key satisfies
π1((M,H)
m+n) = π1((M,H)
m′+n).
This is clear, since this shared secret key can be expressed in terms of A,B, and PB only,
but it may also be explicitly verified. For example, with the operation (1.1),
π1((M,H)
m+n) = π1((A, PA) ◦ (B,PB))
= A⊕B ⊕ PB ⊕ (A⊗ PB)
= π1((A, PE) ◦ (B,PB))
= π1((M,H)
m′+n).
In particular, the eavesdropper may recover the shared secret key via
π1((M,H)
m+n) = π1((M,H)
n ◦ (M,H)m
′
)
= π1((B,PB) ◦ (A, PE))
= B ⊕ A⊕ PE ⊕ (B ⊗ PE).
Finding t as described above requires at most K semigroup operations in M×M. The
binary search, done in the most obvious way, would compute K powers of (M,H), each of
which requires no more than 2K semigroup operations inM×M, for a total complexity of
at most 2K2 +K operations in M×M.
With the parameter sizes suggested in [2], k = 30, N = 1000, and K = 200, our Python
implementation determines such an integer m′ in about 15 minutes on a single core of an i7
CPU at 3.40GHz.
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We would like to make one final remark about the key sizes in this system. With the
notation as above and the operation (1.1), for example, we have
Mℓ+1 =Mℓ ⊕M ⊕H ⊕ (Ml ⊗H).
Since M2 ≤M and M2 ≤ H and Mℓ+1 ≤M2 for all ℓ ≥ 2, it follows that
Mℓ+1 =Mℓ ⊕ (Mℓ ⊗H), for ℓ ≥ 2.
This means that, on average, the entries of Mℓ+1 decrease from those of Mℓ by an approxi-
mately constant amount, proportional to the size of the entries of H . With the parameter
sizes suggested in [2], this means that the entries of A and B are on the order of −c× 2200,
or about 200 bits each, for a total of 30 × 30 × 200 = 180, 000 bits for each of A and B.
Whereas M and H consist of about 9000 bits each, for an increase of around 170,000 bits ;
not the 20,000 bit increase claimed in [2].
3 Conclusion
The attack presented here exploits the fact that the sequence {(M,H)ℓ} is linearly ordered.
It is quite effective and practical against the protocols described in [2]. For those protocols,
Alice and Bob must do approximately O(K) operations in the semigroup M×M, and this
attack requires about O(K2) operations in that same semigroup, so an increase of parameter
sizes does not help.
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